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INTRODUCTION 
 
The lack of trust in American corporations and in corporate management over the 
recent scandals and financial crisis has increased public and legislative outcry for 
accountability in business decisions. Frustration is rampant, with “seemingly 
unending examples of mismanagement, ethical misconduct, and patterned 
dishonesty of a society dubbed ‘the cheating culture’.”1 International competition 
created tremendous risks and rewards but forced companies to attract investors 
through creative accounting practices to raise share value. As a result, three 
decades of corporate greed, inappropriate financial risk-taking and personal 
misconduct eroded trust in corporate decision-making.2  
Corporate governance reform initiatives beginning in 2002 were designed 
to increase financial disclosure and responsibility; however, such legislation is 
insufficient to rebuild public trust in business. Restoring trust requires that those 
individuals who manage corporations, i.e., the board of directors and senior 
officers, comply with requirements for greater accountability and transparency, 
and abide by the legal norms to which boards of directors and management are 
already subject, as directors and officers are legally bound as fiduciaries owing 
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation.3 However, centuries of legal and 
religious formalization and codification have diminished the actual meaning and 
purpose of fiduciaries, with the result that modern corporate fiduciaries have 
limited responsibility toward stakeholders and the greater society. Restoring the 
original definitions and roles of fiduciaries may legitimize and guide the 
corporation in developing new relationships with stakeholders.  
 This paper does not focus on illegal conduct by corporate individuals, 
although many criminal violations of fiduciary norms involve intentional 
assessment of the risk of penalties versus potential profits.4 Rather, the paper 
examines the limitations of today’s corporate fiduciary duties given the original 
intent of the fiduciary relationship. In particular, we examine the definitions of 
fiduciaries and fiduciary responsibilities to determine the extent to which 
formalization and codification have led to avoidance of corporate responsibility. 
We then revisit the historical and religious origins of fiduciaries in commercial 
transactions that defined and shaped the integration of moral and ethical duties in 
                                                          
1
 See David Callahan, The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead 
(Florida: Harcourt, Inc., 2004), 12. 
2
 See LaRue Tone Hosmer, The Ethics of Management, 6th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008). 
3
 Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law, 55 
N.Y.L.S.L. Rev., 421 (2010). 
4
 Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L.S.L. Rev., 457 (2010).  
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 business today yet were so narrowly defined that corporate liability became 
increasingly limited. We propose a modest but well-defined, consistent and 
universal definition of “fiduciary duties,” that could offer corporate managers 
guidance in developing new approaches to stakeholder relationships – 
relationships built on expectations of corporate trust and decision-making that 
maximize shareholder wealth while protecting stakeholders. 
 
THE MODERN FIDUCIARY 
 
Most business students and executives today are introduced to the concept of a 
“fiduciary” in the context of agency law, where a fiduciary is defined as “one who 
has a duty to act primarily for another person’s benefit,” and agency is generally 
defined as “the fiduciary relation that results from the manifestation of consent by 
one person (a ‘principal’) to another (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests or 
otherwise consents so to act.”5 Restatemetn (Third) of Agency states that proof of 
an agency relationship requires the existence of the manifestation by the principal 
that the agent shall act for him; the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking; and, the 
understanding that the principal is in control of the undertaking. The agency 
relationship that results is founded on trust, confidence, and good faith by one 
person in the integrity and fidelity of another, creating certain duties owed by 
each party established in the agency agreement and implied by law.6 Within the 
relationship, fiduciaries have a duty of loyalty – the duty to act primarily for 
another in matters related to the activity and not for the fiduciary's own personal 
interest. 
Fiduciaries also have a duty of good faith – the duty to act with scrupulous 
good faith and candor; complete fairness, without influencing or taking advantage 
of the client. The fiduciary relationship, as defined by history and case law, exists 
in every business transaction. Moreover, the relationship is defined by the specific 
role or function of the agent toward the principal, i.e., the relationship of 
corporate management and boards of directors to shareholders, lawyer to client, or 
broker to client, and governed by the laws associated with those transactions, 
including criminal and labor law, securities and corporate law, contracts, 
partnerships, and trusts.7 The roles of trustees, administrators, and bailees as 
fiduciaries were of ancient origin, whereas agents appeared only at the end of the 
                                                          
5
 Restatement (Third) of Agency, 3rd Ed. §1(1). (2006), Restatement Third of Agency is a set of 
principles issues by the American Law Institute, frequently cited by judges as well as attorneys 
and scholars in making legal arguments. 
6
 Nancy Kubasek et al., Dynamic Business Law (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009), 856,857. 
7
 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 797-802 (1983).  
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 eighteenth century.8 Partners, corporate boards of directors, and corporate officers 
held fiduciary duties originating with the formation of modern partnerships and 
corporations, as did majority shareholders, while union leaders held fiduciary 
roles only when unions were granted power by statute to represent workers in 
negotiations with management.9 While modern definitions of these duties remain 
intact, the scope of the duties greatly varies based on the fiduciary’s role, which 
increases the complexity of analysis required to understand violations of those 
duties.  
 The modern definition of “agent” as a fiduciary was first rationalized and 
clarified as a legal doctrine in 1933:10 “When the person acting is to represent the 
other in contractual negotiations, bargainings or transactions involved in business 
dealings with third persons, or is to appear for or represent the other in hearings or 
proceedings in which he may be interested, he is termed an ‘agent,’ and the 
person for whom he is to act is termed the ‘principal.’” The element of continuous 
subjection to the will of the principal distinguishes the agent from other 
fiduciaries and the agency agreement from other agreements.11 This implies that 
corporate officers and directors are also agents. However, in law and practice 
today, the fiduciary roles of corporate officers and directors are not “continuous 
subjection to the will of the principal (shareholders)” but more flexible as officers 
and directors make many decisions not approved by shareholders. 
 Further, the duties of officers and directors are distinct from those of other 
corporate employees. Corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders (as defined by state case law and Delaware corporate law) while 
employees as agents owe duties to employers, suppliers, vendors, or customers in 
a wide variety of relationships involving trust.12 This distinction has created a 
two-tiered definition of fiduciaries, each with different duties, and varying 
liabilities for breaches of those duties, and is supported by economic theory. Such 
differentiation in fiduciary roles does not appear to be the intention, either 
historically or in modern corporate law. In 1928, Judge Benjamin Cardozo, then 
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, eloquently recognized the 
significance and sanctity of fiduciary principles in Meinhard v. Salmon:13  
                                                          
8
 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev., 801-802. 
9
 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev., 801-802. 
10
 Deborah A. DeMott, “The First Restatement of Agency: What Was the Agenda?,” 32 S. Ill. U. 
L.J., (2007). Restatement (Second) of Agency, 1958, the American Law Institute, is now out of 
print and has been completely superseded and replaced by Restatement of the Law Third, Agency, 
2006. However, some courts will continue to cite to The Restatement of the Law Second, Agency.  
11
 Deborah A. DeMott, “The First Restatement of Agency: What Was the Agenda?,” 31. 
12
 Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries, 58 Ala. L. Rev., 1041 (2007). 
13
 Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries, citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 
164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
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[J]oint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another… the duty of the finest 
loyalty… and the level of conduct for fiduciaries has been kept at a higher level 
than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any 
judgment of this court. 
Cardozo’s opinion reflects three important principles that reinforce a long line of 
precedent in defining a special level of fidelity for all fiduciaries: 1) fiduciary 
matters demand a higher standard than normal marketplace transactions; 2) 
exceptions to the fiduciary standard undermine the duty of loyalty; and 3) neither 
courts nor regulators who interpret, enforce or modify the fiduciary standard 
should consciously weaken it.14 Supreme Court Justice Brandeis later noted that a 
fiduciary "is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely for 
oneself… in which the amount of financial return is not the accepted measure of 
success."15  
Fiduciary Duties: The Required Triad 
The Delaware Supreme Court, renowned for its corporate governance decisions 
and the source of the primary legal standards for the duties and liabilities of 
corporate officers, ruled in 1993, re-affirmed in 2006, and again in 2010, that the 
“triad” of duties includes the duty of loyalty, due care and good faith, where 
“good faith” and “full and fair disclosure” are considered to be the essential 
elements of, or prerequisites for proper conduct, by a director.16 Violation of the 
duty of good faith could remove directors’ protections from liability. The 
Delaware Court also ruled that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as 
corporate directors, noting that it is not possible to discharge properly either the 
duty of care or the duty of loyalty without acting in good faith with respect to the 
interests of the companies’ constituents.17 Major legislation such as The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200218, or The Dodd–Frank Act19 of 2010 support these legal 
                                                          
14
 Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries, 1041.  
15
 See Kenneth M. Rosen, “Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries.” 
16
 See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753-57 (Del. Ch. 2005) (identifying 
possible duty of good faith), aff’d, 906 A.2d 693 (Del. 2006) (affirming the decision of the 
Chancellor). 
17
 Michael Follett, “Note: Gantler V. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A look at the current 
state of officers’ fiduciary duties and advice for potential protection,” 35 Del. J. Corp. L., 563 
(2010).  
18
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 116 Stat 745. Sarbanes-Oxley requires corporate 
officers to be responsible for earnings reports, prohibits accounting firms from acting as 
consultants to accounting clients (a conflict of interest) and increases penalties for fraud.  
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 standards and require that directors and their corporations return to these 
fundamental principles to which they were formally subject already: individual 
integrity and responsibility in corporate governance; and, accountable and 
transparent disclosure of important financial and other information on which 
investors and the stability of the capital markets depend.20 
The Court has long held that the board of directors is ultimately 
responsible for the management of the corporation,21 although boards often 
delegate major decisions to corporate officers with more expertise and 
information on a particular subject. Under Delaware corporate law, officers are 
granted titles and duties through the corporation’s bylaws or the board’s 
resolutions and employees who are not granted this power are deemed agents.22 
Additionally, Delaware law dictates that the terms “officers” or “agents” are by 
no means interchangeable: officers are the corporation, but an agent is an 
employee and does not have the equivalent status of an officer.23 Agents’ specific 
duties include loyalty, performance, obedience, notification, and accounting. 
Again, we see this distinction between officers as managers of the 
corporation and agents as employees as contrary to the historical and case law 
definitions espoused by two leading Chief Justices. It is noteworthy that agents as 
employees (and fiduciaries) are not required to act in a manner that ensures that 
organizational activities are conducted in good faith and with care for 
stakeholder’s interests. Also noteworthy is the omission in corporate law of the 
duty of obedience (to obey the law), which appeared to occupy a recognized place 
in corporations through 1946 but eventually was eliminated. As recent courts have 
made clear that corporate actors cannot consciously violate, or permit the 
corporation to violate, corporate and non-corporate norms, even when it may be 
profitable for the corporation, this duty may be resurfacing.24 The recent Disney 
decision specifically defines the current required triad of fiduciary duties.25 
                                                                                                                                                               
19
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, 
(2010).  
20
 Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Directors Fiduciary Duties After Sarbanes-Oxley (Atlanta: Kilpatrick 
Stockton LLP), 2003. 
21
 Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(a) provides that “[t]he business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(a)(2006). 
22
 See Michael Follett, note 57.  
23
 Michael Follett, note 57.  
24
 Alan R. Palmiter, citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364-65 (Del. 2006), Graham V. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), and Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 
A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996), where directors breached the duty of care for ‘sustained or 
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 The Duty of Loyalty 
 
“[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or 
controlling shareholder and… is not limited to cases involving a financial or other 
cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the 
fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”26 The duty of loyalty is often described as a 
obligation of directors to protect the interests of the company and its stockholders, 
to refrain from decisions that would injure the company or deprive the company 
of profit or an advantage that might properly be brought to the company for it to 
pursue, and to act in a manner that he or she believes is in good faith to be in the 
best interests of the company and its stockholders.27 Recent case law also adds 
that the duty of loyalty requires boards to act “affirmatively and in good faith.”28 
 
The Duty of Care 
 
The duty of care is defined as ‘… that amount of care which ordinarily careful 
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.’29 Courts review the 
standard of care in directors’ decision-making process, not the substance of 
decisions thus limiting director liability for failure in risky decisions. A breach of 
the duty of care may be found when a director is grossly negligent if the substance 
of the board’s informed decision cannot be “attributed to any rational business 
purpose.”30 In response to the financial crisis, legislation has specifically 
addressed the need for increased risk assessment in our financial institutions, 
requiring increased disclosure to ensure that effective reporting systems are in 
place and that all relevant information has been evaluated to ensure financial and 
                                                                                                                                                               
systematic failure’ to assure existence of reporting systems that identify illegal corporate conduct, 
e.g., medical referral kickbacks, 459.  
25
 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006).  
26
 Thomas A. Uebler, “Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors 
Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law,” 33 Del. J. Corp. L., 199 (2008).  
27
 Thomas A. Uebler, “Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors 
Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law,” 201. 
28
 See Thomas A. Uebler. 
29
 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753-57 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 693 
(Del. 2006) . 
30
 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006)), quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971), and Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985),  
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 economic stability. The duty of care is often perceived as a minimal standard, but 
addressing the impact of risk could increase the importance of this standard. 
 
The Duty to Act in Good Faith 
 
In the Disney case, the court stated that “Good faith has been said to require an 
“honesty of purpose,” and a genuine care for the fiduciary’s constituents…”31 A 
director acts in “subjective bad faith” when his actions are “motivated by an 
actual intent to do harm” to the corporation, and bad faith can take different forms 
with varying degrees of culpability.32 The court clearly ruled that the duty of good 
faith cannot be satisfied if directors act in subjective bad faith, consciously 
disregard their duties, actually intend to harm the corporation, or cause the 
corporation to knowingly violated the law.33 
Most legal scholars disagree as to the practical importance of the duty of 
good faith, but proponents of managerial accountability in corporate governance 
look to the doctrine of good faith because the traditional duties of care and loyalty 
do very little to discipline boards, even if allegations of self-dealing were made 
(i.e., violations of duty of loyalty).34 The Disney decision was critical for 
corporate governance since the court recognized that conduct that benefits the 
corporation must be done with proper motives in order to satisfy the duty of good 
faith, thus making boards and senior managers more accountable for their 
decisions. Implicit in these recent cases is the assumption that new rules of 
“conduct” may be useful in restoring trust to a doubting public. To more fully 
understand these new rules of ethical conduct we must turn to the historical 
origins of fiduciary principles. 
 
 
 
ORIGINS OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES 
 
Biblical and Early History 
 
If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development. 
                                                          
31
 In re Walt Disney.  
32
 In re Walt Disney, at 55.  
33
 Peter C. Kostant , “Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law,” 
424,426. 
34
 See Peter C. Kostant , 426-427.  
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 Aristotle, 4th Century BCE35  
 
The historical definition of a “fiduciary” was stated in terms of “an essential code 
of conduct for those who have been entrusted to care for other peoples’ property,” 
carry out transactions, work for another, or aid persons who were vulnerable and 
dependent upon others.36 The breadth and complexity of early trust relationships 
is implicit in today’s corporate organizational structure and business relationships. 
As early as 1790 B.C., the Code of Hammurabi (a Babylonian code of laws) 
established rules of law governing business conduct, or fiduciary considerations, 
for the behavior of agents (employees) entrusted with property.37 For example, a 
merchant’s agent was required to keep receipts and to pay triple damages for 
failing to provide promised goods, although an exception was allowed if losses 
were due to enemy attack during a journey.38 The insightful research of several 
scholars traces the religious roots of the fiduciary principle to the Old and New 
Testaments.39 For example, the Lord told Moses that it is a sin not to restore that 
which is delivered unto a man to keep safely, and penalties must be paid for the 
violation,40 (i.e., duties of loyalty and due care); the right to fair treatment in the 
marketplace,41 implying a responsibility to conduct transactions in good faith; and 
the unjust steward who, expecting to be fired, curries favor with his master’s 
debtors by allowing them to repay less than their full debts, illustrating the precept 
that one cannot serve two masters.42 Additionally, the law on pledges obligates 
everyone to establish his own trustworthiness by carrying out the agreements he 
has made and by being sensitive to the needs of those who depend on him to meet 
                                                          
35
 Amanda H. Podany, ‘Why Study History? A View from the Past,” Presented at The History 
Summit I, California State University Dominguez Hills, May 29, 2008. 
36
 See Kenneth Silber, “Fiduciary Matters,” www.AdvisorOne.com/article/fiduciarymatters, June 
28, 2011.  
37
 Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., “Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Managers,” Journal of Markets 
& Morality (2005), 8:27-51.  
38
 Kenneth Silber, “Fiduciary Matters.”  
39
 See Brian P. Schaefer, “Shareholders Social Responsibility,” Journal of Business Ethics (2008), 
81:297-312; and Stephen B. Young, “Fiduciary Duties as a Helpful Guide to Ethical Decision-
Making in Business, Journal of Business Ethics (2007), 74:1-15.  
40
 John H. Walton, Deuteronomy: An Exposition of the Spirit of the Law, Grace Theological 
Journal 8, 2(1987), 213-25, quoting Leviticus 6:2-5.  
41
 See John H. Walton, quoting Deuteronomy 25:13-16. 
42
 John H. Walton notes that the precept that one cannot serve two masters in Luke 16:1-13 was later 
cited by scholar Austin Scott in an influential 1949 paper “The Fiduciary Principle,” which 
describes boards’ and officers’ responsibility to shareholders and not to other constituents.  
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 their needs (i.e., loyalty of master to servant, employer to employee, seller to 
buyer, powerful to vulnerable). 43  
Fiduciary roles were likened to the roles of stewards in early religious and 
business history as well as in later corporate development. In this context, 
“Fiduciary law secularized a particular religious tradition and applied it to 
commercial pursuits,” where the shepherd tending his flocks may be likened to a 
fiduciary (steward or employer) or an agent (servant or employee) tending the 
sheep for the owner of the flock.44 The ‘steward,’ may be described as a moral 
agent or representative of “God,” a corporate partner or stakeholder whose profits 
could be distributed by the steward to the poor at year’s end.45 Also, the King (as 
steward) was described as God's representative responsible for administering the 
covenant (agreements) for the people, and who must avoid preoccupation with the 
trappings of office while observing the law.46 Thus, the king may be described as 
a model of godliness to the people by governing in a way that conforms to the 
requirements of the covenant.47  
The increasing complexity in fiduciary relationships over time is equated 
to the increasing complexity in the relationship between man and God (as owner) 
in early biblical history. The relationships change as a function of the increase in 
the complexity of the duties demanded of the steward (manager of covenants). 
Similarly, the steward is the precursor to the modern professional fiduciary as 
well as to those corporate directors or officers who owe a duty of care to the 
owners (shareholders) of the corporation as well as a duty of loyalty to all 
                                                          
43
 John H. Walton, “Deuteronomy: An Exposition of the Spirit of the Law,” quoting Deuteronomy 
24:14-15. 
44
 See Stephen B. Young, “Fiduciary Duties as a Helpful Guide to Ethical Decision-Making in 
Business.”  
45
 Sarah Key, “Toward a New Theory of the Firm: A Critique of Stakeholder ‘Theory’,” 
Management Decision (1999), 37:317-328. 
46
 John H. Walton, quoting Deuteronomy 17:14-20, 216.  
47
 Stephen B. Young details the link between fiduciary and ethical duties in the four covenants, or 
agreements, between God and man in the Old Testament that establishes and expands man’s duties 
of care. These covenants allow stewards to impose ethical duties on those who obey them (i.e., 
agents or employees) and reflect the core of modern agency and fiduciary relationships: 1) The 
first covenant establishes Noah as steward of God’s will to care for creation, and if Noah and his 
descendents take good care of creation it would not be destroyed (duty of care for the owner’s 
property); 2) The second covenant requires Abraham to accept the duty to behave according to a 
code of holy behavior in return for protection (protection from liability for accepting the 
responsibilities of duty of loyalty and care); 3) The third covenant requires the children of Israel to 
behave morally with religious devotion in return for protection of all of society (extending 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care from an individual to society, i.e., to all stakeholders); The 
fourth covenant expanded these promises – if the conduct of all mankind is ethical and moral and 
not based on material temptations, Jesus will protect them on earth and grant them entry into 
heaven (fiduciary duties are deeply rooted in moral principles).  
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 stakeholders and to the larger society. Stewards, or fiduciaries, “hold offices with 
authority, power and privileges set by law or custom, separate from individual 
personalities, and such office demands moral duties in private conduct, requiring 
new decision-making habits and reflective capacities that transcend selfishness.”48  
Similar to the descriptions of fiduciaries by Justices Cardozo and Brandeis, the 
description of stewards implies an inherent willingness to serve others (a moral 
duty), and a willingness to subordinate one’s interests to that of others by 
acceptance of the duty to serve. Both in early law and today, the fiduciary, or 
steward, is evaluated and compensated for his performance and understands that 
failure to fulfill his duties will result in penalties. While today’s corporations 
seldom attribute morality to a deity in fiduciary law, acceptance of fiduciary 
duties does require selflessness and a willingness to subordinate the fiduciary’s 
interests to that of another. Aristotle, who lived from 384 B.C. to 322 B.C., 
influenced the development of fiduciary principles, recognizing that in economics 
and business, people must be bound by high obligations of loyalty, honesty and 
fairness, and that when such obligations aren't required or followed, society 
suffers.49  
 
Fiduciaries in Ancient Law 
 
Modern fiduciary law is traceable to developments in Ancient Roman law and 
early English law. Ancient Roman law defined fiduciary relationships as both 
moral and legal relationships of trust. For centuries until the end of the 18th 
Century, Roman law refined and formalized fiduciary law, recognizing various 
“trust” (fiducia) contracts in which a person held property in safekeeping or 
otherwise acted on another’s behalf (the core duties of loyalty and due care), and 
acted in good “faith” (fides) (core duties of honesty, full disclosure and applied 
diligence). Failure to uphold such trust could result in monetary penalties as well 
as a formal “infamy” (infamia), in which one lost rights to hold public office or to 
be a witness in a legal case.50 These fiduciary relationships in early Roman law 
were later incorporated into British courts of equity and then into Anglo-
American law, providing standards for modern corporate law.51  
Early English law established the role of steward or agent with the 
granting of the Magna Carta, an English legal charter issued in 1215 which 
allowed the King to grant charters (companies) yet retain sovereignty (ownership) 
                                                          
48
 See Stephen B. Young and Joseph F. Johnston, Jr.  
49
 John H. Walton, “Deuteronomy: An Exposition of the Spirit of the Law,”  
50
 See Kenneth Silber, “Fiduciary Matters.”  
51
 See Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries.” 
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 in the charter while recognizing the recipient’s limited rights.52 The King served 
as steward, with fiduciary rights (ownership) in the management of his property 
but was required to place the interests of his subjects (inferior rights) above his 
own – a fiduciary relationship. Increasing population growth caused the King to 
transfer his role as steward to town leaders, creating an early form of agency 
(master to servant). Scholars describe the king’s stewardship duties as similar to 
the legal or fiduciary duties ascribed primarily to boards of directors and senior 
officers.53 Town leaders were similar to “agents” or employees who owed duties 
to their “stewards” or employers (managers). The continued development of 
Charter companies and later private companies, during the era of industrialization 
and specialization in business of the 1700-1800s, formalized the role of 
fiduciaries and their specific duties. 
Early common law separated management from ownership (investors), 
creating the office of “manager” to protect the interests of investors and to prevent 
corporate self-dealing.54 Subsequently, fiduciary duties were attached to such 
office, and stewardship duties were borrowed from early law and applied to 
positions of responsibility to promote financial goals. Thus, although a 
“fiduciary” is a term described by legal statute, case law or professional codes of 
conduct, this term also describes ethical obligations and duties in a wide variety of 
business and personal activities and encompasses a “legal or moral recognition of 
trust, reliance, or dependence and of responsibility often ignored” 55 
 
A MODEST PROPOSAL: NEW RULES OF FIDUCIARY CONDUCT 
 
Legal standards for management behavior can be traced to “deeply rooted moral 
standards” that shaped the "fiduciary principle, a principle of natural law 
incorporated into the Anglo-American legal tradition underlying the duties of 
good faith, loyalty and care that apply to corporate directors and officers.” 56 
Scholars examined early fiduciary history as a potential solution to understanding 
corporate misconduct, suggesting that revisiting those early fiduciary principles 
might answer the questions: To what standards should managers be held?; and 
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 What are the historical and conceptual bases for these standards?57 Alternatively, 
if one assumes that fiduciaries are responsible to the company’s shareholders as 
well as to a wider set of constituents, one might ask questions such as: In whose 
interests does the company presently function?; and, In whose interests should it 
function in the future?58 The latter set of questions not only asks who is served by 
the company, but also suggests that stakeholders bear some general rights as 
citizens, and should be protected against an abuse of power or violation that 
causes injury, as citizens.  
If the role of a fiduciary is ascribed only to corporate boards and officers 
or to licensed professionals, corporate misconduct at other levels may go 
undetected. Despite this, corporate management argues that directors and officers 
are responsible only to shareholders, and that corporate management cannot serve 
two masters, i.e., multiple groups of stakeholders. To the contrary, history has 
demonstrated that fiduciary duties have been and can be the responsibility of all 
corporate members, and these duties may be extended to all stakeholders and the 
larger society. Research supports the theory that the corporation should have one 
set of duties for multiple stakeholders, an argument made by managers in the 
1990s that managers had the skills and independence to mediate fairly among the 
firm’s stakeholders, and could assemble innovative teams capable of expanding 
wealth and economic opportunity.59 Managers sustained this claim well into the 
1990s, both within their firms and within their major business associations but by 
1997 pressure from the global commodity and national financial markets 
persuaded managers to revise their stakeholder standard. The perception is that 
managers moved from a focus on a single duty of loyalty to shareholders, to a 
narrower focus on making their principals (shareholders) and themselves rich, 
while disassociating themselves from the ideal of widening economic opportunity 
and improving living standards for the many.60 The Clarkson Principles, a set of 
principles for stakeholder management, are considered to be a critical academic 
effort to revive the idea that managers should be obligated to expand material 
opportunities for the many through economic growth.61 Additionally, compliance 
with fiduciary duties can reduce the principal’s costs of monitoring and 
disciplining agents and lessens the need for government regulation.62  
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 Today, although most major corporations support the idea of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), and believe that CSR and profit maximization work 
together, they continue to support the Freidman view that “The social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”63 A top executive of a major 
oil company illustrates this view in the comment that “a socially responsible way 
or working is not… a distraction from our core business. Nor does it in any way 
conflict with our promise and our duty to deliver value to our shareholders.”64  
  We propose that adherence to a new understanding and rule of fiduciary 
principles goes hand in hand with CSR and profit maximization and is perhaps the 
missing link in today’s corporate governance. The essential definition of a 
fiduciary does not change – a fiduciary is a person who has a duty to act primarily 
for the benefit of another. However, the role of the fiduciary should extend to all 
corporate members, and the duties of the fiduciary should not differ regardless of 
the specific function or distinction in roles. The primary focus of all corporate 
members continues to be to the shareholders (owners of the corporation), but 
duties toward other stakeholders should be consistent with those duties to 
shareholders.  Any differentiation lowers the high standard of fidelity required of 
fiduciaries.  Thus, the duties of loyalty, good faith, due care and obedience to the 
law should be incorporated fully into all fiduciary relationships, regardless of role 
or function within the corporation.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
“Many of the most shocking examples of corporate misbehaviors involve conduct 
that violates existing law.”65 This result occurs when most cost-benefit analysis 
weighs the potential harm and subsequent penalties against the potential profits, 
resulting in an ethical question often ignored because of the focus on maximizing 
shareholder profitability. Therefore, reform initiatives for boards of directors and 
corporate governance “without proper attention to ethical obligations will likely 
prove ineffectual.”66 Schwartz et al. found that board and officer leadership by 
example and action are roles central to the overall ethical and governance 
environment of their firms, a leadership role that is reinforced by board members’ 
legal responsibilities to provide oversight of the financial performance of their 
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 firms – based on the assumption that ethical corporate leadership results in the 
best long-term interests of the firm. 
 Thus, Schwartz et al.’s study of corporate boards of directors demonstrated 
that boards have a professional duty expressed as a fiduciary duty to make ethics-
based decisions. We contend that ethics and morals in line with fiduciary 
principles must permeate the entire corporate culture, if corporate governance 
reform is to succeed. A return to those central values inherent in ethical and 
fiduciary duties extended to the greater community as well as to shareholders may 
provide more socially responsible guidelines for corporations in this period of 
stakeholder demand for increased government regulation. Defining and providing 
examples of fiduciary values of honesty, loyalty, integrity responsibility, fairness 
and citizenship can provide guidance for corporate fiduciary relationships with all 
stakeholders, and provide a more efficient voluntary control mechanism. Thus, we 
contend that consistent fiduciary principles should be implemented throughout the 
firm, regardless of the corporate member’s function or role.67 This view is 
consistent with Friedman’s view, that a corporate executive is an employee of the 
owners of the business, owes responsibility to his employers to conduct the 
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as 
much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, embodied 
both in law and ethical custom.68  
Our review of the historical and religious origins of fiduciary relationships 
demonstrates that the concept of fiduciary was intended to be both a societal and a 
legal principle, and this is consistent with Friedman’s view of obeying the law and 
social custom. The leaders of organizations, as stewards, were responsible to the 
whole organization, and to society, not just to themselves or shareholders. Perhaps 
a revitalization of the stewardship principle is part of the new perspective required 
to create sustainable competitive advantage in today’s economy. We believe that 
there is room for stakeholder-focused management that does no harm to 
shareholder interests while also benefiting a larger constituency, and that 
fiduciary duties require the exercise of care, loyalty, obedience and good faith 
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 with regard to shareholders as well as to all stakeholders and the larger 
community.69  
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